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Political geographers draw distinctions in English between borders, usually 
conceived of as lines on a map, and frontiers, which are seen as zones. In 
German, Grenze, a word borrowed from Slavic, and reflecting ethnic differences 
is often used for both. In French frontière with its roots in medieval warfare, 
covers both concepts. Beginning with some considerations of Alsace/Elsaß as a 
frontier zone between Germany and France, this paper will review ongoing 
debates among historians of nationalism on the definitions of nations, states, and 
frontiers. It will then trace the historical development in Europe of these concepts 
from antiquity into the early modern period. It was during the dynastic power 
struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the concepts of nation 
and state took on fundamental political significance as rulers made claims to 
sovereignty in the name of historical nations and borders became enshrined in 
“international” law as the result of the peace treaties signed in Westphalia in 
1648. The essay questions both the historical depth of nations, states, and 
borders and the teleological assumption of their inevitability and permanence in 
human political relations. Nations, states, and borders are mental constructs. 
They were imagined and can be reimagined. A close examination of Alsatian 
history shows the bloody historical effects of applying these concepts arbitrarily in 
a cultural borderland and the potential for a different political future for Europe by 
reimagining borders. 
 
Peter G. Wallace received his doctorate at the University of Oregon and is a 
Professor of History at Hartwick College in Oneonta, New York. His published 
works include Communities and Conflict in Early Modern Colmar, 1575-1730 
(1995) and the recently released second edition of The Long European 
Reformation: Religion. Political Conflict and the Search for Conformity, 1350-
1750 (2012). He is currently working on a book exploring borders and identities in 
the early modern Upper Rhine valley, tentatively entitled, Friends, Neighbors, 
Strangers, and Enemies: Changing Political Identities in the Upper Rhine Valley, 
1580-1740, which is under contract with Brill Publishers. The essay that appears 
in Konturen reflects his understanding of the historical development of nations, 
states, and borders from the perspective of contemporary Alsatians. 
 
Although banned from entering the kingdom of France, Voltaire spent six 
unpleasant months in the Alsatian town of Colmar in 1753-54, where he planned 
to write a historical work, Les Annales de l’Empire, from his new perch at this 
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“window open to Germany.”  Colmar and in fact all of Alsace was part of the 
French kingdom in its form as a composite state subject to Louis XV, but in ways 
distinct from l’intérieur, a phrase still used by Alsatians today. Voltaire’s stay at 
Colmar proved a disaster, and when he left the city, he referred to the 
Colmarians as “half-French, half-German, and totally Iroquois.”1  I have shared 
this quip in a number of settings; but when I cited it to an Alsatian friend, he 
replied, “we are totally French, totally Alsatian, and Voltaire was a fool.”  His tone 
informed me that he counted me with Voltaire for having cited him. Alsatian 
history since 1754 is littered with the victims of wars fought over its “national” 
identity – wars instigated far from Alsace – and it has been difficult to study its 
more distant past – as I do – without recognizing the filters of 1870, 1914, and 
1940.2  These dates mark the outbreak of wars between France and Germany 
that have highlighted the political dilemma of Alsace, caught between two 
imagined national identities: French and German.3 
In 1932, Edmond Vermeil, a noted French professor of German history, 
reflected on religion and politics in Alsace as part of his personal campaign to 
awaken France to the degree to which Alsatians were alienated from their fellow 
countrymen. He described the world of the rural Alsatian parishes in terms not 
unlike Voltaire’s: 
 Let us turn…away from the beaten roads and make a brief 
examination of the Alsatian rural parish, which alone can give an 
understanding of what one may call Alsatian ‘confessionalism’ in all 
of its peculiar flavor, all of its diffident narrow-mindedness, all of its 
pitiless localism. This confessionalism tends like everything 
Alsatian to cut itself off from the life of the outer world and to stand 
aloof in a separate unit, compact, circumscribed, and humdrum. 
For Vermeil Alsace was a small territory wedged between two great national 
civilizations. It was a borderland between two conceptions of life and religion: a 
German confessional world-view, which regarded civil authority and religious 
authority as one and which held that the duty of the state was to Christianize 
society thoroughly; and the “Western,” French view, where culture and the state 
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were thoroughly secularized and in civil society the Church comprised one of 
many forms of free association. For Vermeil Alsace was part of France but stood 
apart from France because the laws of the Third Republic, including the Law of 
Separation of Church and State of 1905, which had shut down religious 
education, had not been applied to Alsace when reintegrated into France in 
1919.4 Vermeil feared that the degree of autonomy, which French officials had 
permitted Alsace, would drive it from France and draw it to Germany. The 
Maginot line – a massive network of bunkers, fortresses, and tunnels dug into the 
Alsatian plain since 1919 had created a defensive frontier in depth against 
Germany, but Vermeil feared that the frontières invisibles or in German the 
“unsichtbare Grenzen” (invisible borders) or “die Grenzen im Kopf” (mental 
borders) would continue to separate the Alsatians from their French national 
identity.5 
 I am deeply honored to have the opportunity to participate in this 
interdisciplinary conference on walls sponsored by the University of Oregon’s 
German Studies Committee. I earned my doctorate here in History in 1983, and I 
am thrilled to be back within this intellectual community. Many of the 
presentations for this conference address the impact of real walls – the Berlin 
Wall, the Great Wall of China, the Wall separating Israel from the Palestinians in 
Gaza and the West Bank, and the growing ‘fence’ between the United States and 
Mexico. The seventeenth-century fortresses of Vauban and the Maginot Line 
might resemble such physical barriers in Alsatian political geography, but what I 
think that I can best contribute to this conference are some reflections on the 
relatively recent historical construction of borders as invisible boundaries – even 
in Europe – which in turn offers the possibility for their deconstruction. I will draw 
briefly from my thirty years of research in the Upper Rhine valley, but the bulk of 
this presentation will be a macro-historical overview of the inter-related 
development of nations, borders, and states in pre-modern Europe – a process 
which has come to justify walled borders whether visible or invisible. I offer this 
approach because belief in the normative character of nations, borders, and 
states in geo-political discourse remains quite influential. What I share may 
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already be well known to many of you, but I would hope that this historical 
overview offers a helpful context for the other papers from this symposium. 
  
I. Theoretical models: State, Nation, and Borders 
 
War is the most dynamic force of historical change. Armies depopulate the 
countryside, devastate towns, disrupt economic relations, and scatter refugees to 
the winds. Peace treaties redraw political boundaries turning neighbors into 
foreigners and strangers into compatriots. Scholars in political geography argue 
that the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the Peace of Westphalia that 
concluded it served as the nursery of the modern “post-Westphalian” state, a 
form of political organization that assigns legal sovereignty over a broad and 
impermeable territorial space to a centralized political body at the expense of 
local authorities and in contrast to and often conflict with other sovereign 
territorial states whose boundaries are contiguous to it.6  Once conceptually 
grounded in this first European-wide treaty, the model became the norm in inter-
dynastic European politics and then spread with European power across the 
globe.7 
In the nineteenth century when the academic disciplines of history and 
geography became professionalized, scholars in political history and political 
geography came to treat the post-Westphalian state as an autonomous subject – 
to reify the state or even to anthropomorphize it – animating and legitimating the 
will of the state as the self-conscious mask for the will of those in power within it.8  
We might reflect on the problems that this normative assumption has presented 
to international agencies seeking to intervene in the now sovereign Sudans, or 
the obstacles to mustering the collective international will to interfere even in 
“failed states.”  Moreover, a second assumption that the sovereign state is the 
territorial unit in mapping the globe has meant that in modern times the state has 
been the only legitimate player in international relations. These assumptions 
have reinforced each other and have formed the core of modern analyses of the 
state; however, the growing role of non-state actors in international relations, 
from Doctors without Borders, to multi-national corporations, to terrorist 
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organizations, suggests that the modern state is one historical construct for 
global political relations rather than the normative form for political systems. 
In his recent book, the historian, Daniel Nexon, has argued that power 
politics involves an interplay between various institutions of which the state is 
only one possible configuration. His analytical approach, which he calls 
“relational institutionalism,” shifts focus away from states as the unique legitimate 
entity in international relations and sees all institutions, including states, as 
networks of social relations of power.9  Post-modern political geographers have 
also come to analyze states “not as autonomous subjects but as processes of 
subject-making” in which the claim to sovereignty justified by whatever legitimate 
authority – God or the people – provided political cover for territorial acquisition 
and state-building by power elites.10  These processes become clearer when we 
examine early modern history as states and nations acquired their normative 
cloaks. 
Following the Peace of Westphalia, the state-building power elites were 
the noble agents of monarchical dynasties, who used the princes’ claims to 
sovereignty by divine right over their subjects to build “absolutist” states.11  As the 
eighteenth century progressed, claims to sovereignty by kings and the noble 
privileges that sustained them came under attack by competing political values, 
which championed the source of sovereignty in the people as a reified and often 
anthropomorphized body called “the nation.”12  In a great and bloody 
revolutionary struggle that began in 1789 and extended through much of the 
nineteenth century, the nation overthrew the king as the perceived legitimate 
source of sovereignty, even in states that retained kings, and the modern nation-
state emerged.13  The political agents for this victory were nationalists who 
according to John Breuilly legitimized their claims with three axioms: 
1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests 
and values. 
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at 
least the attainment of political sovereignty.14 
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But what is a nation, and how had it achieved this new political status? 
 There are as many theories on what comprises nations as there are 
scholars working the field, which has produced what the political scientist, Walker 
Connor, calls “terminological chaos.”15  One error that he notes in many analyses 
is the mistake of equating nationalism with loyalty to the state rather than loyalty 
to the nation. It may seem at first glance that for Japan and the Japanese or 
Iceland and the Icelanders, the state and the nation are identical, but Connor 
notes that countries like these represented only 12 of the 132 “nation-states” 
recognized by the United Nations in 1971. At that time there were twenty-five 
others (19%) in which the dominant ethnic community represented over 90% of 
the population. Including this group, only 1/3 of the world’s nation-states were 
nations with their own states prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia.16  I would note that the United States might be the world’s poorest 
ethnic model for a nation-state. With the addition of South Sudan in 2011 there 
are now 193 members in the United Nations; and though I don’t have the data, I 
would argue that the percentage of classic nation-states in 2009 (and now 2012) 
is lower rather than higher.17  Ethnic cleansing and the contemporary walls that 
we are discussing at this symposium reflect both the desire to monopolize the 
state for the officially circumscribed “nation” and the near impossibility of realizing 
that goal.18 If we accept the nationalists’ claim that every nation or potential 
nation should have its own state as a norm for geopolitics, then we are faced with 
a new century of bloody and irresoluble conflicts in future Bosnias, Chechnyas, 
and Kurdistans. 
Nationalism thus has been the most dynamic and corrosive force in 
twentieth-century global politics. All of the walls we are considering at the 
symposium, even in Berlin, reflect the effort to define and secure nation-states.19 
In our globalizing twenty-first century, the contradictions between state 
boundaries and ethnic and national identities furnish the tinder for political 
violence. Nationalists seek a sovereign territorial state to shelter their nations, 
however defined. Ethnic nationalists view their national identity as “natural” and 
primordial, yet historical research debates the depth of national self-
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consciousness among pre-modern elites, with some, known as modernists, 
arguing that it is perhaps no more than two centuries old, and only learned and 
internalized by the “common folk” much later.20  Benedict Anderson’s conception 
of modern nations as “imagined political communities,” first articulated in the 
1980s, still serves as a dominant model in the field. He identifies the roots of 
modern national self-consciousness first in the administrative “pilgrimages” of 
early modern royal officials from the provinces to the capital and back and 
second in emerging language communities defined by the growth of print 
vernaculars. For Anderson, nations were the secular successors to pre-modern 
imagined religious communities offering worldly salvation in the inheritance of a 
national past and the legacy of a national future. Politically, he argues that 
modern nations were first imagined “from above” by the elite and then gradually 
absorbed by a widening reading public in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.21  On the other hand, Anthony D. Smith has argued that modern 
nations find their histories “from below” in linguistically, symbolically, and 
historically knitted pre-modern cultural communities, which he refers to as 
“ethnies,” the residue of whose pasts provide modern nationalists with a quiver of 
ethno-historical symbols to employ internally to reinforce the legitimacy of their 
cause among party members and then to broadcast externally to achieve public 
resonance and rally followers to their cause.22  For Smith, national 
consciousness existed as a political force before nationalism and played a critical 
role in framing the legitimacy of nationalist discourse. Thus the two dominant 
schools of thought regarding modern nationalism build their arguments on 
different analyses of early modern European political communities. So if the 
modern state and modern nation emerged in the early modern period, what of 
borders?  
 English has a number of words associated with borders. In the Merriam 
Webster On-line dictionary, a border is an outer part or edge; a frontier is a 
border between two countries or a line of division between two different and 
opposed things; a boundary is something that limits or fixes a limit or extent; and 
a borderland is a territory at or near a border.23  This diversity can lend itself to its 
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own form of terminological chaos. In German, Grenze currently covers all of the 
English equivalents, as does frontière for French, though both of these terms 
assumed their conceptual coherency in the modern era. Günther Lottes argues 
that this recent semantic inclusiveness, however, masks the complexity of the 
subject, and scholars in both languages have resorted to a “wealth of adjectives” 
to sharpen their analyses.24 If we consider the myriad of possibilities, we might 
start our own analysis by distinguishing between borders as lines and borders as 
zones. 
In classic political geography, borders are imaginary lines that enclose the 
territory and define the spatial edge of sovereignty for the post-Westphalian 
state.25  Thus borders operate in two ways: they enclose the monopoly of state 
power within; and they keep the power of foreign states out. English scholarship 
usually uses the term frontier to define a zone or region where two distinct 
cultures meet. A frontier can be relatively stable serving as a buffer zone 
between two opposing cultures or values where they may meet, interact, and 
engage in various economic and cultural exchanges. Sometimes such a zone 
has its own distinct culture. A frontier may also define a region where one 
superior culture is expanding into another “barbarous” one, such as Frederick 
Jackson Turner’s frontier. Most historians assume that pre-modern political zonal 
frontiers eventually coalesced in modern linear borders.26  I would note that 
historically Alsace has served as both types of frontier, a unique land between 
Germany and France and a region that neighboring powers sought to make 
French or German. It would seem then that the history of frontiers is complex and 
intertwined with the history of nations and states.27  I now turn to these 
interconnected histories.  
 
II. Historical Development in Europe 
 
As we have seen European nationalists claim primordial roots for their nations, 
and the modern nation-state emerged in theory and in practice as the teleological 
end product of European political history, at least until the emergence of the 
European Union, which has helped re-historicize the nation-state.28  The nation 
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as a concept in European political imagination can be traced back to Old 
Testament Judaism and Greco-Roman civilization. The story of the Jews 
recounted in the Bible seems to confirm the antiquity of nations, and in a recent 
essay Anthony D. Smith considers the Jews, Armenians, and Egyptians as 
potential case studies of national consciousness in Antiquity.29  The biblical Jews 
were the chosen people of their God, sharing common descent from Abraham, 
distinct from other and lesser peoples, with a manifest destiny plotted out in 
history. As part of their covenant with God, they had conquered a territorially 
bound kingdom – their promised land. Their covenant was a collective pact 
between the Jews and their God and was to a degree egalitarian, as under 
Jewish law all Jewish men were equal. When they failed to maintain their 
covenant, God providentially intervened and deprived them of their sovereignty 
over the Promised Land, and they had to wait for a messiah to restore that 
kingdom. This is the classic story of a nation. 
 We now know that ancient Jewish scribes created or at least refashioned 
much of this history – including Abraham and maybe even Moses – when they 
reconstructed the Torah during the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century 
BCE.30  The Jews, who actually conquered the Promised Land, were a hodge-
podge of extended clans, who followed their conquest by intermarriage and 
integration, eventually consolidating into kingdoms. In the wake of the political 
collapse of those kingdoms, the scribes associated the demise of the kingdoms 
of Israel and Judea with Jewish acculturation with Canaanites and Philistines. 
These scribes called for communal purity to restore the kingdom, and to support 
this goal they reconstructed their history with a pure line of descent from 
Abraham through Moses to themselves as Prophets.31  The seminal place of the 
Bible in European civilization would enshrine this historically constructed account 
as a divinely-inscribed model of political culture. 
 If the Bible helped Europeans imagine a nation, Greco-Roman civilization 
offered two models for constituting its membership. The ancient Greeks referred 
to extended kinship groups as ethnoi, which is the source for our term, ethnic and 
where Anthony D. Smith draws his term “ethnies.”  Classical Greeks normally 
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applied the term to their Greek enemies, but they unconsciously cherished their 
own ethnicity. Only males from the ethnos could claim full membership in the 
polis through the myth of common heritage from a founding father, such as 
Theseus for Athens. Members of the polis reinforced their ethnic identity through 
exclusive participation in common religious rites and territorialized it through 
claims of autochthony (nativism).32  To be an Athenian citizen in the age of 
Pericles, one had to have a citizen mother and father. Naturalization was 
impossible, and Athenian males literally locked up their wives to ensure their own 
paternity and the citizenship rights of their sons. Slaves, who comprised the 
majority of the residents of Athens, and resident guest workers, such as Aristotle, 
could never claim full status as citizens.33  Thus from Greek traditions Europeans 
have drawn the close association between ethnic identity and membership in the 
political community. This would be the model embraced by German and other 
European nationalists who saw and see ethnicity as the unsichtbare Grenze 
between nations.34 
 The Greeks reserved a special antipathy and violence for fellow Greeks 
and enslaved them when they could. The broader and, what nineteenth-century 
writers saw as, the national sense of “Greek-ness” (Pan-Hellenism) emerged in 
the wake of war with the Persian Empire and was enshrined and calcified in 
literature – although not as often believed by Herodotus.35  The Greeks – or 
rather the Athenians – saw in their victory a superiority of language and culture, 
lumping together the highly sophisticated Persians with other non-Greek 
speakers as “barbarians” defined initially by how they spoke. Barbarism in its full 
sense, however, implied a dichotomy to Greek-ness, which could not be undone 
by learning to speak Greek. Benjamin Isaac has argued that defining barbarism 
carried with it an early discourse of racism.36  Whether his assertion is true or not, 
Asia was a source of myths for Greeks to define themselves against. In the wake 
of the Persian wars, Greek authors recalled the myth of Europa, an Asian 
princess from Tyre, who was abducted by Zeus/Greeks, raped, and abandoned 
on Crete where her twin sons became the first Europeans. The Athenians 
juxtaposed Europa’s story with the abduction of Helen. Europa’s male relatives 
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left her to her captors; Homer’s Greeks did not. For the Greeks and later 
Europeans, the different responses distinguished European masculinity from the 
effeminate indolence of their male Asian neighbors. Yet Greek poleis peppered 
the coastline and islands of Asia Minor, and the borders between these 
continents and their peoples were not natural but invisible cultural boundaries 
defined by Greek writers.37  This discourse of Europe and Asia endures, and 
tensions over participation of Turkey in the European Union or in the Europa Cup 
reflect the strength of these Greek myths of separation.38 
The Romans provide a different legacy for European political culture. 
From the foundation of the Republic, ethnic Romans integrated many of their 
conquered enemies into the Roman state as allies and then as citizens. 
Together, Roman citizens – native and naturalized – built the Roman Empire. By 
the third century CE, almost all free males could claim citizenship.39  For most 
Romans, however, citizenship was passive and limited to a set of legal rights, tax 
obligations, and military responsibilities. From the beginning only a small group of 
male householders actively participated in res publica (public matters). In the 
early Republic they were known as Patricians and later they were known as 
“honest men” (honestiores), a status which gave these men distinctive legal 
rights over citizens of Plebeian or later humiliores status.40  Administratively 
Rome, as a state, was a polyglot federation of nearly 400 city-states (civitates). 
Roman citizens spoke all sorts of languages; yet their interactions with the 
Roman state occurred in Latin at institutions housed in their local civitas.41 
 Once they had conquered their Empire and after a failed foray into the 
North German forests, the Romans built walls called limes, which enclosed the 
limits of Roman sovereignty and civilization. The Romans fortified all their 
frontiers even in the North African Sahara where there was no military threat, for 
the Romans also used the walls to supervise migrants and to funnel and tax 
commerce, which remains a critical role for modern borders today.42  
Nevertheless, despite the physical line of the walls, C. R. Whittaker and others 
have argued that the Roman limes remained a frontier, sometimes of expansion 
against barbarian forces and other times as a zone of exchange.43  In general, 
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however, the Romans viewed people living beyond the walls as uncivilized – not 
belonging to a civitas – and whose only political association was as a natio 
(nation) from the Latin verb nascor – to be born from.44  For Romans descent 
from a common ancestor, so valued by the Greeks, was not the foundation of 
political culture. Citizenship made one Roman; and Romanization was a civilizing 
experience available to all. Personal commitment to religious or ethnic 
communities among Roman citizens was tolerated, so long as it did not interfere 
with loyalty to the Republic.45  Here we have the second model for an imagined 
political community derived from citizenship, one that Vermeil identified as 
Western and French in contrast to Germanic ethnicity.  
 With the fall of the Roman Empire, medieval Germanic kingdoms, 
including the Franks, became Europeanized and civilized by becoming 
Christianized through the ministrations of the Roman Catholic Church, the 
institutional midwife to the rebirth of ancient traditions of the Jews, Greeks, and 
Romans. Medieval Christian political theorists nurtured the memory of the 
Roman Empire and transformed the imagery of the Roman political community to 
the Respublica Christiana – the Christian Republic, or Christendom.46  This 
immense imagined religious-political community was bound by shared faith with 
Latin as its common language. Gestures and words associated with Christian 
religious practice quickly connected strangers, whether noble or serf, as the 
community of God’s chosen people equally liable to salvation in the eyes of 
God.47  Christendom also possessed frontier zones beyond which non-Christian 
outsiders both pagans and later Muslims resided, but Christians also perceived 
invisible internal boundaries that separated them from Jews living within 
Christendom.48  
In medieval Europe, political relations were inter-personal, and one was 
incorporated (from the Latin corpus for body) into the body politic. People were 
“members” – consider what we mean by a dismembered corpse – in all sorts of 
corporate bodies from guilds, to confraternities, to communes, to kingdoms, and 
to the Church itself as the mystical body of Christ on earth. Medieval law even 
recognized commercial corporations as legal individuals in contractual relations 
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and suits.49  Two theories justified authority within corporate bodies. The first, 
hierarchical and rooted in Roman imperial law, saw sovereign authority 
descending from God through the pope, emperor, or king downward to the 
people. Medieval rulers initially claimed sovereignty over their subjects, not 
specific territories. Clovis was king of the Franks not of France, and even the 
“Father of Europe,” Charlemagne, was crowned “Imperator Romanorum” 
(emperor of the Romans) by Pope Leo III on Christmas day in 800.50  The 
second theory was communal and rooted in Germanic conventions. It grounded 
sovereign authority in mutual oaths sworn among relative equals. Italian and 
Flemish civic communes and Swiss Eidgenossenschaften (oath associations) 
selected members from the community of “oath swearers” as temporary 
representatives of their collective will.51  Both models spelled out a code of 
conduct for their adherents, though neither accurately depicted political reality. 
Communal assemblies generated hierarchies, and royal charters called on the 
community of the realm as often as on divine authority. 
Medieval states were assemblies of people, identified in the sources as 
gens, populus, or natio, where invisible borders separated members from non-
members;52 nevertheless, the Europeans were also beginning to think 
territorially.53  As with models of sovereignty, boundaries began to define the 
European landscape from above and below. The medieval church was the first 
European political institution to define its authority territorially. Beginning in the 
Carolingian era, church officials divided Europe’s religious landscape into 
diocese and parishes, whose boundaries encompassed legal authority and 
regulated tax collection through tithes.54  At the Treaty of Verdun in 843, the 
noble advisors for Charlemagne’s three warring grandsons were able to draw up 
surprisingly precise boundaries for the three kingdoms, though Lothar’s middle 
kingdom, which included Alsace, would eventually be conquered and partitioned 
by his brothers’ successors in the French and German kingdoms to the west and 
east.55  Nevertheless, the most significant push for borders came from below. 
Towns and villages built walls to defend themselves and regulate commerce. 
Villagers laid out boundary stones to claim usufruct of forests and fields, and 
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peasants referred to landmarks in defining their strips of plough-land. Medieval 
borders first emerged to delineate private and collective properties and to mark 
the jurisdictional limits of lordship.56  In the feudal political system control over 
justice was the source of power; over time these jurisdictional boundaries would 
gel to fashion firmer, if invisible, boundaries between lordships, counties, 
duchies, and ultimately kingdoms. 
By the age of the Reformation, Europe’s principalities, as the 
predecessors of the post-Westphalian state, were composite assemblies of 
distinct legal bodies bound to the king by inter-personal contracts. The character 
and scope of sovereignty varied from region to region within the dynastic 
domain.57  Early modern states functioned through networks of aristocratic 
families bound together by personal ties rather than through institutional 
structures. Royal councils, central and regional law courts, and fiscal chambers 
would eventually provide the skeleton of a state, but the human muscle that 
moved it responded to other neurological stimuli than modern bureaucrats. 
Politics entailed a welding of private interest onto royal service. Officials treated 
their posts as personal property, allocated to them as members of a distinct and 
privileged class. They governed through a distribution of favors, both personal 
and official, and by calling in debts and obligations from clients. Devotion to a 
superior and generosity to subordinates were honorable and ethical traits.58 
These aristocratic elites envisioned themselves as the community of the realm, 
and they jealously defended the “public” interest, which meant their collective 
private rights grounded in local and regional properties.59 To be effective in this 
system, rulers had to play a double game, first to employ networks of social 
relations across institutional borders through regional power brokers to realize 
regal will but then also to maintain power by preserving regional and social 
distinctions to prevent consolidated resistance from their subjects.60  Benedict 
Anderson argues that within these early modern dynastic states a cadre of 
officials came to see the kingdom as a whole through what he calls 
administrative “pilgrimages.” Royal agents moved outward to the outlying districts 
of the kingdom, and officials from those regions also came to court. Both began 
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to imagine a political community – but not yet the nation – within the borders of 
the realm.61 
 It was the Reformation that would transform European political culture and 
provide the framework for nations initially from below and later from above. The 
reformers conceptualized their new churches in the biblical model of the chosen 
people of Israel. Though Luther and others preached and ministered in local 
settings, they were able to spread their message, through the innovation of print, 
in pamphlets and broadsheets to a broader yet still linguistically circumscribed 
imagined community of believers.62  The Word of God, preached and printed in 
the vernacular, was central to all Protestant denominations, and the growing 
demand for vernacular publications dried up the market for Latin texts, in time 
even in Catholic regions, and relegated many regional mother tongues to 
dialects.63  In the century and a half before the Reformation, the papacy had 
barely weathered a schism that had cost it much of its political clout. Fifteenth-
century popes signed concordats with various European princes that gave those 
princes significant control over ecclesiastical institutions and officials within their 
domains. As a result individual cities, duchies, and kingdoms responded to the 
call for Reformation differently. Some embraced specific territorial Protestant 
confessions, while even princes who remained Catholic did so on their own 
terms, embracing Papal-centric Tridentine Catholicism, belatedly, partially, or not 
at all, creating – if you will – territorial “Catholicisms.”64 The initial round of 
religious wars fought within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation 
resulted in stalemate embodied in the religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555, 
which granted the Empire’s lay princes the right to determine the official faith of 
their subjects, later encapsulated under the phrase, cuius regio eius religio.65 
 As Vermeil noted in his critique of Alsatian German-ness, this new model 
of religious politics bound the emerging state to a Christianizing mission, which 
modern Reformation scholars refer to as confessionalization; that is, enforced 
religious conformity by the authorities on fellow citizens or subjects.66 Those 
subjects, who could not accept the prince’s religion, could claim the ius emigrandi 
(the right to emigrate), and became Europe’s first political refugees.67  Elsewhere 
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the Inquisition enforced religious conformity in the Spanish kingdoms, while in 
England Henry VIII’s successors assumed the title Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England. In France after a series of bitter and bloody religious civil 
wars, Henry IV converted to Catholicism and signed the Edict of Nantes in 1598, 
which granted religious rights to a Protestant minority – the Huguenots – 
confined to certain regions of the kingdom. In all, the latter sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century saw “confessional cleansing” drive religious minorities, as 
communities of faith, out of many kingdoms and smaller territories or into small 
enclaves.68  The Reformation thus not only concentrated sovereign power in the 
hands of the monarch at the expense of regional interests, but also created 
imagined communities of faith circumscribed spatially by print vernaculars and 
increasingly engaged in the political process.69 
 In 1618 a religious rebellion of the regional, Bohemian, Czech-speaking 
Hussites against their Catholic, German-speaking, Austrian Habsburg monarch, 
Ferdinand II, ushered in the Thirty Years War. The ensuing conflict that engaged 
most of Europe was fueled in part by the dynastic struggle between the Catholic 
Bourbon kings of France and the Catholic Habsburgs with one branch in Austria 
holding the Imperial Crown in Germany and the other in Spain. Despite the inter-
dynastic framework of the conflict, confessional affiliation played a critical role in 
the depth and violence of the war, especially in Germany (including Alsace), 
which was the main battlefield.70  In the end, the five years spent negotiating in 
the Westphalian cities of Münster for the Catholic ambassadors and Osnabruck 
for the Protestants established the protocols for future interstate peace 
negotiations.71  The peacemakers sought resolution of conflicts and satisfaction 
of dynastic claims by drawing borders as lines – not arbitrarily but rather 
respecting earlier local jurisdictional boundaries. The new state borders were 
designed to secure peace by “satisfying” dynastic claims. The signatories also 
agreed to honor the peace in perpetuity, at least regarding the settlement within 
Holy Roman Empire, and as late as 1779, Russia would have to sign the Peace 
of Westphalia as a prerequisite for participating in the negotiations to end the war 
of Bavarian succession.72 The Peace of Westphalia reaffirmed the principle of 
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cuius regio eius religio, but also established 1624 as the normative year for 
claims of confessional rights within the Empire and allowed private worship for 
religious minorities – thus weakening the overlap of territorial sovereignty and 
confessional conformity.73  When German princes converted to Catholicism in the 
ensuing decades, their subjects retained their rights to practice their Protestant 
faith in state-supported churches;74 such state-sponsorship of officially-
sanctioned religion remained in effect in Alsace as late as 1932 and was 
detested by Vermeil. Though religion remained politically significant in Europe 
and within European states after 1648, the ability of established churches to 
nurture potent political communities was weakened. 
As noted earlier, the scope of the Thirty Years’ War had concentrated 
political power in the hands of central sovereign authorities, in what some 
historians have called “absolute” monarchy. The stimulus for “absolutist” 
administrative centralization and the concomitant expanding scope of 
governance in the daily lives of subjects derived from pressures for military 
modernization.75  By the late seventeenth century, the increasing effectiveness of 
artillery made the cost of fortifications prohibitive, ending the independence of 
most urban republics. Gradual improvements in musketry and the development 
of the socket-bayonet demanded a collective battlefield discipline inculcated by 
regular close-order drill, which professionalized military life, first in the form of 
mercenary units and later in conscript standing armies drawn from the kingdom’s 
dependent peasantry and poor, who formed the first “national” guards in 
Europe.76 Standing armies remained in active service during peacetime and 
required year-round housing in barracks in place of the older practice of 
temporarily quartering troops in private homes. An effective organization and 
chain of command allowed armies to mushroom in size. Most dynastic armies 
exceeded 100,000 men, and by 1710 perhaps a million Europeans were under 
arms.77  It was often the case that the army and the debts accrued in wars 
accounted for four-fifths of state expenditures. A significant cost was the 
constructions of thick networks of fortifications. Louis XIV initially had his chief 
engineer, Vauban, build “Alsatian” fortresses at Philipsburg, Breisach, and 
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Freiburg im Breisgau beyond the Rhine – France’s imagined “natural frontier” – 
as entry points into Germany, but once defeated in 1697, Louis retreated back 
across the river and built new fortresses in Alsace at Huningue, Neuf-Brisach, 
and Strasbourg to defend France’s natural frontier from within the kingdom 
against foreign German assaults.78  To pay for all of this, finance ministers 
concocted innovative means of extracting tax revenues from royal subjects, but 
ultimately officials recognized that the best means of providing revenues was to 
encourage growth in the economy by fostering industry and regulating trade 
through tariffs collected at the kingdom’s border crossings. The customs’ house, 
with its royal coat of arms above the door, joined fortresses as markers of 
Europe’s borders.79  Tariff boundaries existed within kingdoms too, as the 
residue of composite state-building from accumulated rights of lordship, but these 
internal divisions came to be seen as unnatural and detrimental to economic 
growth.  
Thus Europe’s post-Westphalian kingdoms remained essentially 
composite states, assembled over centuries by dynastic unions and conquest, 
with each territorial component normally entitled to “ancient” rights and privileges. 
The Austrian Habsburgs faced linguistic and religious barriers in ruling a dynastic 
empire that included Italian-, Flemish-, and Hungarian-speaking elites and 
peasants who spoke a bewildering array of Slavic tongues, and so they still relied 
on Latin as the common administrative language.80 The German-speaking ruler 
of the United Kingdom, George I (*1715–27), governed Gaelic speaking Scotland 
and Ireland by negotiating with “national” parliaments at Edinburgh and Dublin.81 
Even the model absolute monarch, Louis XIV, had to appeal to provincial estates 
to authorize new taxes and to register laws. He also recognized independent 
foreign enclaves, such as the duchy of Lorraine and the papal county of 
Venaissin surrounding Avignon, within the “natural frontiers” of France that he 
had waged a half-century of war to attain.82   
 Whatever the territorial vision cherished by the monarchy or the growing 
consciousness of the scope of the state among elites, the bulk of the common 
folk lived their entire lives within twenty miles of their birthplace. This was their 
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Heimat or their pays, and beyond the invisible boundaries of perceived homeland 
people were Fremde or étrangers – a term still in use today. They spoke a Babel 
of mother tongues – local dialects learned from their mothers, which quickly 
identified them as highlanders, or southerners, or Florentines.83  As Eugene 
Weber has argued the peasants would not become Frenchmen until deep into 
the nineteenth-century.84  The awakening of national consciousness had to begin 
with the eighteenth-century elites. 
Down to the fourteenth century clerical education at universities was a 
traditional pathway to governmental service, except in Italy where a new cohort 
of lay officials had emerged, who were educated in civic schools and who 
modeled their political behavior on ancient pagan statesmen such as Cicero, in a 
self-styled rebirth of classical values. In the writings of Livy, Polybius, and Cicero, 
these Renaissance humanists rediscovered the classical Roman model of 
citizenship and civil society. Since the ancient authors were themselves or wrote 
about politically active Patricians, many Renaissance scholars sought the active 
political life in what has been termed civic humanism.85  Such values made sense 
in the Italy’s remaining republics, such as Florence and Venice, where in 
principle the source of sovereignty still resided in the people. Italian humanists 
were proud of their Roman heritage, while humanists beyond Italy came to see 
their ancient national profile in the Roman ethnography of Caesar’s Gallic Wars 
and Tacitus’ description of the German and British nationes. The humanists 
began to talk of the proud historical roots of the German nation or Gallican and 
British values.86  Luther and his followers presented their Reformation in part as a 
German struggle for freedom against Rome, while French Catholics defended 
the independence and uniqueness of their Gallican Catholic Church that had 
been achieved through a series of concordats with a weakened Roman pontiff. 
The spread of print vernaculars helped further fashion a self-conscious audience 
who could draw on history to imagine a political community of Frenchmen or 
Germans, but such imaginings resonated differently among distinct ethnic 
communities in the early modern composite states.87  The wars of religion had 
also added the possibility of legitimate resistance to the despotic rule of princes 
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who oppressed confessional minorities, divinely justified in these communities of 
faith by the example of the biblical Jewish covenant.  
In mid seventeenth-century England, what began as a religious struggle 
between Parliament and the king led to a crisis of political legitimacy.88  Who had 
a right to rule?  Both sides laid claim to that right in a social contract with the 
people. Derived from feudal traditions, the royal contract was not between 
equals, but the parliamentary model – later articulated by John Locke – posited a 
state of nature in which equal men formed the political community and set the 
framework for civil government. This community was not defined by ethnic bonds 
nor by religious conformity, which appeared to have been the king’s goal, but 
rather by civility and willingness to sacrifice some private interests to share in the 
commonwealth of public affairs (res publica).89  This renewed and secularized 
Roman model would later justify rebellion in the English colonies. During the 
Enlightenment, Locke’s model was reworked and given an ethnic/cultural edge in 
French and German political discussions.90  The territorially bounded 
monarchical states framed the discourse as French philosophes re-imagined 
Locke’s social contract as the basis of sovereignty for the French nation, an elite, 
bourgeois [in the French sense of town-dwelling], French-speaking political 
community that was then fashioning itself in what Jürgen Habermas has called 
the public sphere, an urban world of capitalist consumer culture where ideas 
were exchanged over coffee, tea, sugared sweets, and tobacco.91  Thus by 1789 
the nation as the source for sovereignty in the already territorially bounded post-
Westphalian state had emerged as the normative form for political relations. Over 
the next century and a half, Europeans would try to realize that norm through 
national revolutions, international wars of unprecedented violence, and horrific 




I have moved around a lot of intellectual furniture, and I want to justify why I felt 
this should be my contribution to the symposium. First, my main point is that in 
contemporary international relations the bordered, sovereign nation-state is the 
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norm, but that norm is recent and teleologically justified. Frontiers, the nation, 
and the state have long conceptual histories in Europe, but the particular 
configuration was fashioned in the early modern period and has had a checkered 
and bloody legacy. The preamble of the European Charter of Border and Cross-
Border Regions begins with the statement: “Borders are ‘scars of history.’”92 If we 
accept the interlocking of these three concepts as historically constructed, then 
they can be historically deconstructed. The question remains what level of 
violence might such deconstruction entail.  
 Let me return finally to Alsace. I would argue that Voltaire, Vermeil, and 
my Alsatian friend were all correct in their assessments of Alsatian political 
identity. We have seen that there are two ways to frame the nation: ethnic roots 
or active citizenship. Alsatian is a German dialect, and down to 1648, Alsace was 
part of the Reich, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Its elites had 
served regional power brokers within the Imperial system, read German print 
vernacular, prayed and sang hymns in German during church services, and 
could imagine themselves as historical descendants of Tacitus’ Germans. The 
Peace of Westphalia and the wars of Louis XIV brought Alsace as a new 
“province” into Louis XIV’s composite state. During the eighteenth century as the 
concept of the nation as a political source of legitimacy grew, German authors 
emphasized the Volk, while French authors drew on a fuzzier concept of the 
civilizing effects of French culture – they even coined the term civilization. The 
Alsatian elites had learned French, and Voltaire correctly sensed the tension 
among his Alsatian hosts about their political identity. The French Revolution 
embraced citizenship as the foundation for political participation, but during the 
wars waged by the French Revolutionaries some still questioned how French the 
Alsatians truly were.93   
In the wake of the French Revolution, German ethnic nationalism 
strengthened and was a critical force in pushing toward a German nation-state, 
which was achieved in 1870 following the Franco-Prussian war, a conflict that 
also brought Alsace into Bismarck’s Second German Reich. The tension 
between the two models remained. In a famous speech delivered in 1882 at the 
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Sorbonne, Ernest Renan championed the normative character of the Western 
French model of the civic nation, when he referred to the nation’s existence as a 
“daily plebiscite.”94 Within such a model Alsatians could become French. Most 
Alsatians, however, remained in their villages and accepted their German-ness. 
The ever-present Alsatian village monuments in French to the Victimes de 
Guerre 14-18 testify to the early twentieth-century Alsatians willingness to die for 
the Vaterland.95  When Vermeil visited the region in 1932, he felt the continued 
tension between the French emphasis on civil society and the German focus on 
ethnicity in what remained the only loosely integrated piece in the unified French 
republic. When war came and the Maginot line failed to prevent the German 
conquest, the Alsatians were once again rejoined to the Third German Reich. 
France itself had fallen, and civil society there had ceased. Alsatians were 
conscripted into the Wehrmacht and died in German uniforms on the Russian 
front. By war’s end, the region’s German-ness tasted sour in Alsatian mouths. 
Since the war civil society has returned to Alsace, to France, to a united 
Germany, and to Europe. My Alsatian friend understands the mixed inheritance 
of being Alsatian differently than Voltaire or Vermeil. He embraces his regional 
cultural identity, his Alemannic ethnicity, but that embrace does not make his 
national identity any less integral. Political identities do not have to be all or 
nothing, and unsichtbare Grenzen or frontières invisibles are complex and, I 
would argue, situational.  
I will finish with another anecdote – if I may – which I feel captures the 
issues of my talk. When I began my research in Alsace in 1980, we lived in the 
village Horbourg just outside of Colmar in an apartment that was a converted 
patisserie with floor to ceiling windows. Once a week the windows would rattle as 
Mirage jets flew overhead on bombing runs in a large open field near the Rhine. 
Rumor had it that one French pilot had flown too close to the German border and 
ditched his jet in the Rhine rather than enter “enemy” air space. I tell this story 
not because I believe that it is true, but rather because Alsatians enjoyed telling 
the story and the bombing practice was real. France had withdrawn from NATO 
joint military command in 1966 and would not rejoin until April 2009. In the story 
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the pilot is responding to la frontière dans son crâne, and his response seemed 
to be within the realm of possibility in the mentality of some Alsatians in 1980, 
because of the collective memory of 1870, 1914, and 1940. History builds 
invisible walls between people that can endure. However, I believe that such a 
rumor would make much less sense in contemporary Alsace due to changes in 
the nature of Europe and in the meaning of its borders. Real walls can be torn 
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